Pañcattayasutta

Suttapiṭaka · Majjhimanikāya · Vol. 14 · Section 36

[36] Bhikkhus, as to those ascetics and brahmins therein who hold such a doctrine, such a view: "The self (attā) and the world are not eternal; this alone is true, anything else is vain" … "The self and the world are both eternal and not eternal" … "The self and the world are neither eternal nor not eternal" … "The self and the world are finite" … "The self and the world are infinite" … "The self and the world are both finite and infinite" … "The self and the world are neither finite nor infinite" … "The self and the world are of unified perception (saññā)" … "The self and the world are of diverse perception" … "The self and the world are of limited perception" … "The self and the world are of measureless perception" … "The self and the world are exclusively happy" … "The self and the world are exclusively suffering" … "The self and the world are both happy and suffering" … "The self and the world are neither suffering nor happy; this alone is true, anything else is vain" — that for these there should arise personal knowledge (ñāṇa), pure and bright, apart from faith, apart from preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after consideration: this is not possible. But, bhikkhus, when there is no personal knowledge, pure and bright, then whatever mere portion of knowledge those honorable ascetics and brahmins clarify therein, even that is declared to be clinging (upādāna) on the part of those honorable ascetics and brahmins. "This is conditioned (saṅkhata) and gross; but there is the cessation of formations — there is this." Having known thus, seeing the escape from it, the Tathāgata has gone beyond it.

English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.