[419] 12.
Abiding each in his own view (diṭṭhi),
having grasped [it], the experts assert diversely:
"Whoever knows thus has known the Dhamma (dhamma);
rejecting this, one is incomplete (akevalī)."
Having thus grasped [their views] they dispute,
and they declare, "The other is a fool (bāla), unskilled (akusala)."
Which assertion, pray, of these is the true (sacca) one?
For all of these claim to be skilled (kusalā).
If one who does not accede to another's teaching
is thereby a fool, a beast (mago) of inferior wisdom (paññā),
then all of them are fools of utterly inferior wisdom—
for all of these abide in [their own] views.
But if by their own view they are cleansed,
purified in wisdom, skilled, intelligent,
then none of them is of inferior wisdom,
for their views too have been taken up in just the same way.
But I do not say, "This is actual (tathiva)"—
that which they say of one another in mutual [contention]: "a fool."
They have made each his own view the truth;
therefore they account another "a fool."
What some say is "true, actual,"
that others say is "hollow, false";
having thus grasped [their views] they dispute.
Why do the ascetics (samaṇā) not say one [and the same thing]?
Truth indeed is one—there is no second—
concerning which one who knows might dispute with one who knows;
[but] they, of themselves, proclaim diverse truths;
therefore the ascetics do not say one [and the same thing].
But why do they proclaim diverse truths,
these debaters who claim to be skilled?
Are the truths [they have] heard indeed many and various,
or do they [merely] follow out speculation (takka)?
There are not indeed many and various truths
permanent in the world, apart from perception (saññā);
but having contrived speculation upon [their] views,
they assert a pair of things: "true" and "false."
The seen, the heard, virtue and vows (sīlabbata), or the sensed (muta)—
relying on these, one looks [on others] with contempt;
standing upon his judgments (vinicchaya), exultant,
he says, "The other is a fool, unskilled."
By the very [measure] by which he accounts another "a fool,"
by that he calls himself "skilled";
of his own accord declaring himself skilled,
he despises another, yet speaks in just the same way.
Fulfilled in his overreaching view,
drunk with conceit, deeming himself perfect,
he has of his very self anointed himself in mind;
for that view of his has been taken up just so.
For if by another's word one is inferior,
then oneself, together [with him], is of inferior wisdom;
but if of oneself one is a master of knowledge (vedagū), a sage,
then there is no fool among the ascetics.
"Those who profess a teaching other than this
have failed of purity (suddhi); they are incomplete"—
thus too the sectarians (titthiyā) speak in manifold ways,
for they are deeply inflamed with passion for their own view.
"Here alone is purity," so they assert;
they allow no purification (visuddhi) in other teachings—
thus too the sectarians are severally entrenched,
affirming their own way (sakāyana) firmly therein.
But one affirming his own way firmly—
whom here could he account "a fool"?
He would only bring strife (medhaga) upon himself
in declaring another a fool, one of impure teaching.
Taking his stand upon judgment, having formed his own measure,
he comes to further dispute in the world;
but having relinquished all judgments,
a person makes no strife in the world.
The Cūḷaviyūha Sutta, the Twelfth [is ended].
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The Mahāviyūha Sutta, the thirteenth [discourse] of the Aṭṭhakavagga, the fourth [chapter] of the Suttanipāta.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.