Mahāvaggadiṭhikathā

Suttapiṭaka · Khuddakanikāya · Paṭisambhidāmagga · Vol. 31 · Section 345

[345] In how many of the five ways is there adherence (abhinivesa) through the extremist view (antaggāhikā diṭṭhi) that "the Tathāgata does not exist after death"? The view that is a misapprehension (parāmāsa) through adherence, thus: "Form is subject to death right here; with the breakup of the body the Tathāgata is annihilated and perishes; the Tathāgata does not exist after death" — by that view that extreme is grasped, therefore it is an extremist view. The view is not the basis (vatthu); the basis is not the view. The view is one thing, the basis another. The view together with the basis — this is the first extremist view that "the Tathāgata does not exist after death." The extremist view is wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) … These are fetters, not views. The view that is a misapprehension through adherence, thus: "Feeling (vedanā) is subject to death right here; perception is subject to death right here; volitional formations are subject to death right here; consciousness is subject to death right here; with the breakup of the body the Tathāgata is annihilated and perishes; the Tathāgata does not exist after death" — by that view that extreme is grasped, therefore it is an extremist view … It is in these five ways that there is adherence through the extremist view that "the Tathāgata does not exist after death."

English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.