[126] "And what, Cunda, are those standpoints for views (diṭṭhinissaya) connected with the final end, which have been declared by me to you in the way that they have been declared — and in the way that they should not be declared, why should I declare them to you thus?
Cunda, there are some ascetics and brahmins who are of such a doctrine, of such a view: 'After death the self (attā) is material, free from disease (aroga); this alone is true, anything else is vain.' And there are, Cunda, some ascetics and brahmins who are of such a doctrine, of such a view: 'The self is immaterial …' … 'The self is both material and immaterial …' … 'The self is neither material nor immaterial …' … 'The self is percipient …' … 'The self is non-percipient …' … 'The self is both percipient and non-percipient …' … 'The self is neither percipient nor non-percipient …' … 'The self is annihilated, is destroyed, does not exist after death; this alone is true, anything else is vain.'
Therein, Cunda, as to those ascetics and brahmins who are of such a doctrine, of such a view: 'After death the self is material, free from disease; this alone is true, anything else is vain' — I approach them and speak thus: 'Is there indeed, friends, this statement: "After death the self is material, free from disease"?' But as to what they say thus: 'This alone is true, anything else is vain' — that I do not concede to them. Why is that? Because herein, Cunda, there are some beings who perceive otherwise. And even with regard to this designation (paññatti), Cunda, I do not see anyone equal to myself — whence then one superior? Rather, it is I alone who am superior therein, that is, in respect of the higher designation (adhipaññatti)."
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.