[125] Therein, Cunda, those ascetics and brahmins who are of such a doctrine, of such a view: 'The self and the world are not eternal' … [text abbreviated: saṅkhittaṃ] … 'The self and the world are both eternal and not eternal'; 'The self and the world are neither eternal nor not eternal'; 'The self and the world are made by oneself'; 'The self and the world are made by another'; 'The self and the world are made both by oneself and by another'; 'The self and the world, not made by oneself, not made by another, have arisen fortuitously'; 'Pleasure and pain are eternal'; 'Pleasure and pain are not eternal'; 'Pleasure and pain are both eternal and not eternal'; 'Pleasure and pain are neither eternal nor not eternal'; 'Pleasure and pain are made by oneself'; 'Pleasure and pain are made by another'; 'Pleasure and pain are made both by oneself and by another'; 'Pleasure and pain, not made by oneself, not made by another, have arisen fortuitously — this alone is true, anything else is vain' — them I approach and say thus: 'Is it so, friends, that this is asserted: "Pleasure and pain, not made by oneself, not made by another, have arisen fortuitously"?' And when they say thus: 'This alone is true, anything else is vain,' I do not grant them that. Why is that? Because on this matter, Cunda, there are some beings who perceive otherwise. Even with respect to this designation (paññatti), Cunda, I do not see anyone equal to myself — how then anyone superior? Rather, it is I who am superior therein, that is to say, in the higher designation (adhipaññatti).
These, Cunda, are the standpoints of views (diṭṭhinissayā) connected with the past which I have declared to you in the way they should be declared. And as to the way they should not be declared — why should I declare them to you in that way?
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.