Piṇḍolyasutta

Suttapiṭaka · Saṁyuttanikāya · Khandhavaggasaṁyutta · Vol. 17 · Section 169

[169] "Bhikkhus, there are these two views (diṭṭhi): the view of existence (bhavadiṭṭhi) and the view of non-existence (vibhavadiṭṭhi). Therein, bhikkhus, the instructed noble disciple reflects thus: 'Is there anything at all in the world which, clinging (upādāna) to it, I would be blameless?' He understands thus: 'There is nothing at all in the world which, clinging to it, I would be blameless. For in clinging, it is just form (rūpa) that I would be clinging to; in clinging, it is just feeling (vedanā) that I would be clinging to; in clinging, it is just perception that I would be clinging to; in clinging, it is just volitional formations that I would be clinging to; in clinging, it is just consciousness that I would be clinging to. With that clinging of mine as condition, there would be existence (bhava); with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair would come to be. Such would be the origin of this whole mass of suffering (dukkha).' "What do you think, bhikkhus: is form permanent or impermanent?" "Impermanent, venerable sir." "And that which is impermanent — is it suffering or happiness?" "Suffering, venerable sir." "And that which is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change — is it fitting to regard it thus: 'This is mine, this I am, this is my self'?" "No indeed, venerable sir." "Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Is consciousness permanent … "Therefore, bhikkhus, … Seeing thus, … he understands: '… there is no more of this state of being.'"

English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.