Mahāvaggadiṭhikathā

Suttapiṭaka · Khuddakanikāya · Paṭisambhidāmagga · Vol. 31 · Section 314

[314] How does one regard the self as possessing form? Here someone regards feeling (vedanā), perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as self. He has this thought: "This indeed is my self; but this self of mine possesses form by means of this form" — thus he regards the self as possessing form. Suppose there were a tree possessed of shade, and a man were to speak of it thus: "This is the tree, this is the shade; the tree is one thing, the shade is another; but this tree possesses shade by means of this shade" — thus he regards the tree as possessing shade. In the same way, here someone regards feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as self. He has this thought: "This indeed is my self; but this self of mine possesses form by means of this form" — thus he regards the self as possessing form. Misapprehension through adherence (abhinivesaparāmāsa) is a view; the view is not the basis, the basis is not the view; the view is one thing, the basis is another. Whatever the view and whatever the basis — this is the second view of self (attānudiṭṭhi), having form as its basis. The view of self is wrong view … These are fetters, but not views. Thus one regards the self as possessing form.

English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.

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