[326] How does one regard the self as possessing volitional formations?
Here someone regards consciousness (viññāṇa), form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), or perception (saññā) as self. He thinks thus: 'This indeed is my self; but this self of mine possesses volitional formations (saṅkhārā) by means of these volitional formations' — thus he regards the self as possessing volitional formations. Just as there might be a tree possessed of a shadow, and a man might speak of it thus: 'This is the tree, this is the shadow; the tree is one thing, the shadow another; but this tree possesses a shadow by means of this shadow' — thus he regards the tree as possessing a shadow. Even so, here someone regards consciousness, form, feeling, or perception as self. He thinks thus: 'This indeed is my self; but this self of mine possesses volitional formations by means of these volitional formations' — thus he regards the self as possessing volitional formations. The misapprehension through adherence is a view (diṭṭhi). The view is not the basis; the basis is not the view. The view is one thing, the basis another. The view together with the basis — this is the second view of self (attānudiṭṭhi) having volitional formations as its basis. View of self is wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) … These are fetters, not views. Thus one regards the self as possessing volitional formations.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.