[318] How does one regard the self as possessing feeling (vedanā)? Here someone regards perception, volitional formations, consciousness, or form (saññaṃ saṅkhāre viññāṇaṃ rūpaṃ) as self. He thinks thus: 'This indeed is my self; but this self of mine feels with this feeling' — thus he regards the self as possessing feeling. Just as there might be a tree possessed of a shadow, and a man might speak of it thus: 'This is the tree, this is the shadow; the tree is one thing, the shadow another; but this tree, by this shadow, is possessed of a shadow' — thus he regards the tree as possessing a shadow; even so, here someone regards perception, volitional formations, consciousness, or form as self. He thinks thus: 'This indeed is my self; but this self of mine feels with this feeling' — thus he regards the self as possessing feeling. The misapprehension through adherence (abhinivesaparāmāsa) is a view (diṭṭhi); the view is not the basis (vatthu), and the basis is not the view; the view is one thing, the basis another. The view together with the basis — this is the second view of self (attānudiṭṭhi), having feeling as its basis. The view of self is wrong view, a failure in view … These are fetters, but not views. Thus one regards the self as possessing feeling.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.