[329] How does one regard consciousness (viññāṇa) as self? Here someone regards eye-consciousness (cakkhuviññāṇa), ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness (manoviññāṇa) as self: "What mind-consciousness is, that I am; what I am, that is mind-consciousness" — he regards mind-consciousness and self as not two. Just as, when an oil lamp is burning, "what the flame is, that is the colour; what the colour is, that is the flame" — one regards the flame and the colour as not two; even so, here someone regards mind-consciousness as self: "What mind-consciousness is, that I am; what I am, that is mind-consciousness" — he regards mind-consciousness and self as not two. The misapprehension through adherence is a view. The view is not the basis, and the basis is not the view; the view is one thing, the basis another. The view together with the basis — this is the first view of self (attānudiṭṭhi) having consciousness as its basis. The view of self is wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) … These are fetters, but not views. It is in this way that one regards consciousness as self.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.