[322] How does one regard the self as possessed of perception (saññā)?
Here someone regards volitional formations (saṅkhārā), consciousness (viññāṇa), form (rūpa), and feeling (vedanā) as self. It occurs to him thus: "This indeed is my self; but this self of mine is percipient by means of this perception" — thus he regards the self as possessed of perception. Just as there might be a tree possessed of a shadow, and a man might speak of it thus: "This is the tree, this is the shadow; the tree is one thing, the shadow another; but this tree is shadowed by this shadow" — thus he regards the tree as possessed of a shadow. Even so, here someone regards volitional formations, consciousness, form, and feeling as self. It occurs to him thus: "This indeed is my self; but this self of mine is percipient by means of this perception" — thus he regards the self as possessed of perception. The misapprehension through adherence is the view; the view is not the basis, and the basis is not the view; the view is one thing, the basis another. The view together with the basis — this is the second view of self (attānudiṭṭhi) having perception as its basis. View of self is wrong view (micchādiṭṭhi) … These are fetters (saṃyojana), but not views. Thus does one regard the self as possessed of perception.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.