[1066] "Should knowledge (ñāṇa) that has contact (phassa) as its object (ārammaṇa) be called 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds (cetopariyāya-ñāṇa)'?"
"Yes."
"If knowledge that has contact as its object should be called 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds,' then indeed it should not be said that 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds has only mind (citta) as its object, not anything else as its object.'"
"Knowledge that has feeling (vedanā) as its object … knowledge that has perception (saññā) as its object, knowledge that has volition (cetanā) as its object, knowledge that has mind as its object, knowledge that has faith (saddhā) as its object, knowledge that has energy (viriya) as its object, knowledge that has mindfulness (sati) as its object, knowledge that has concentration (samādhi) as its object, knowledge that has wisdom (paññā) as its object … knowledge that has lust (rāga) as its object … knowledge that has hatred (dosa) as its object … Should knowledge that has lack of moral dread (anottappa) as its object be called 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds'?"
"Yes."
"If knowledge that has lack of moral dread as its object should be called 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds,' then indeed it should not be said that 'knowledge of the ways of others' minds has only mind as its object, not anything else as its object.'"
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.