[50] Bhikkhus, there are some ascetics and brahmins who are proponents of Nibbāna in the present life (diṭṭhadhammanibbāna), who declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being (sato sattassa) on five grounds. And relying on what, taking up what, do those honorable ascetics and brahmins, proponents of Nibbāna in the present life, declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being on five grounds?
Here, bhikkhus, some ascetic or brahmin holds such a doctrine, such a view: 'Sir, when this self, furnished and endowed with the five cords of sensual pleasure (kāmaguṇa), amuses itself — to that extent, sir, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in the present life.' Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being.
Another says to him: 'There is, sir, that self of which you speak; I do not say it does not exist. But it is not to that extent, sir, that this self attains the supreme Nibbāna in the present life. For what reason? Because, sir, sensual pleasures are impermanent, suffering (dukkha), and subject to change; from their change and alteration there arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. But when, sir, this self, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by thought (vitakka) and examination (vicāra), with rapture (pīti) and happiness born of seclusion — to that extent, sir, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in the present life.' Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being.
Another says to him: 'There is, sir, that self of which you speak; I do not say it does not exist. But it is not to that extent, sir, that this self attains the supreme Nibbāna in the present life. For what reason? Because whatever thinking and examining there is there, by that it is declared to be coarse. But when, sir, with the subsiding of thought and examination, this self enters and dwells in the second jhāna, which has internal confidence and unification of mind (citta), is without thought and without examination, with rapture and happiness born of concentration (samādhi) — to that extent, sir, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in the present life.' Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being.
Another says to him: 'There is, sir, that self of which you speak; I do not say it does not exist. But it is not to that extent, sir, that this self attains the supreme Nibbāna in the present life. For what reason? Because whatever rapture and elation of mind there is there, by that it is declared to be coarse. But when, sir, with the fading away of rapture, this self dwells equanimous, mindful and clearly comprehending, and experiences happiness with the body, and enters and dwells in the third jhāna, on account of which the noble ones declare: "Equanimous and mindful, he dwells in happiness" — to that extent, sir, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in the present life.' Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being.
Another says to him: 'There is, sir, that self of which you speak; I do not say it does not exist. But it is not to that extent, sir, that this self attains the supreme Nibbāna in the present life. For what reason? Because whatever attention of mind to "happiness" there is there, by that it is declared to be coarse. But when, sir, with the abandoning of pleasure and the abandoning of pain, and with the previous passing away of joy and grief, this self enters and dwells in the fourth jhāna, which is neither painful nor pleasant and has purity of mindfulness through equanimity — to that extent, sir, this self has attained the supreme Nibbāna in the present life.' Thus do some declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being.
These, bhikkhus, are the five grounds on which those ascetics and brahmins, proponents of Nibbāna in the present life, declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being. Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or brahmins, being proponents of Nibbāna in the present life, declare the supreme Nibbāna in the present life for an existing being, all of them do so on these same five grounds … by which those speaking rightly would speak the Tathāgata's praise in accordance with fact.
These, bhikkhus, are the forty-four grounds on which those ascetics and brahmins who are speculators about the future, holding views about the future, assert various propositions of conviction concerning the future. Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or brahmins, being speculators about the future, holding views about the future, assert various propositions of conviction concerning the future, all of them do so on these same forty-four grounds … by which those speaking rightly would speak the Tathāgata's praise in accordance with fact.
These, bhikkhus, are the sixty-two grounds on which those ascetics and brahmins who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, and speculators about the past and the future, holding views about the past and the future, assert various propositions of conviction concerning the past and the future. Bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or brahmins, being speculators about the past, or speculators about the future, or speculators about the past and the future, holding views about the past and the future, assert various propositions of conviction concerning the past and the future, all of them do so on these same sixty-two grounds, or on one or another of them; outside of these there is none.
This, bhikkhus, the Tathāgata understands: 'These standpoints for views, thus grasped, thus adhered to, have such a destination, such a state in the world beyond.' That the Tathāgata understands, and he understands what surpasses it; and that very understanding he does not misapprehend; and for him who does not misapprehend, quenching (nibbuti) is known within himself. Having known as it really is the origin and the passing away of feelings (vedanā), their gratification, their danger, and the escape from them, the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, is freed through non-clinging.
These, bhikkhus, are the dhammas that are deep, hard to see, hard to awaken to, peaceful, sublime, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise, which the Tathāgata, having realized them for himself with direct knowledge, makes known — by which those speaking rightly would speak the Tathāgata's praise in accordance with fact.
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.