MahāvaggavaggaMahāvagga

Abhidhammapiṭaka · Kathāvatthu · Vol. 37 · Section 52

[52] [Sakavādin:] Is the person (puggala) apprehended in a real and ultimate sense (saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭha)? [Paravādin:] Yes. [Sakavādin:] Is feeling (vedanā) the person? … Is the person in feeling? … Is the person apart from feeling? … Is feeling in the person? … Is perception (saññā) the person? … Is the person in perception? … Is the person apart from perception? … Is perception in the person? … Are volitional formations (saṅkhārā) the person? … Is the person in volitional formations? … Is the person apart from volitional formations? … Are volitional formations in the person? … Is consciousness (viññāṇa) the person? … Is the person in consciousness? … Is the person apart from consciousness? … Is consciousness in the person? [Paravādin:] It should not be said so. [Sakavādin:] Acknowledge the refutation (niggaha): if the person is apprehended in a real and ultimate sense, then indeed, good sir, it should be said that consciousness is in the person. What you say there — that it should indeed be said that the person is apprehended in a real and ultimate sense, yet it should not be said that consciousness is in the person — is wrong. But if it should not be said that consciousness is in the person, then indeed, good sir, it should not be said that the person is apprehended in a real and ultimate sense. What you say there — that it should indeed be said that the person is apprehended in a real and ultimate sense, yet it should not be said that consciousness is in the person — is wrong. …

English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.

This passage also appears in 5 other places