[18] [Sakavādin:] "Is the person (puggala) apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact (sacchikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭhena), and is feeling (vedanā) apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact? … And is perception (saññā) apprehended? … And are volitional formations (saṅkhārā) apprehended? … And is consciousness (viññāṇa) apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact?"
[Paravādin:] "Yes."
[Sakavādin:] "Is consciousness one thing and the person another?"
[Paravādin:] "It should not be said so."
[Sakavādin:] "Acknowledge the refutation (niggaha): If the person is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, and consciousness is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, then indeed, sir, it should be said that consciousness is one thing and the person another. What you say there — that it should indeed be said that the person is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact and that consciousness is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, yet it should not be said that consciousness is one thing and the person another — is wrong. But if it should not be said that consciousness is one thing and the person another, then indeed, sir, it should not be said that the person is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact and that consciousness is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact. What you say there — that it should indeed be said that the person is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact and that consciousness is apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate fact, yet it should not be said that consciousness is one thing and the person another — is wrong. …"
English translation from the Pali (Siam Raṭṭha edition) — under review, not for citation.